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This article examines three types of additionality – input, output and behavioural - in a cross-
country framework. Besides conducting a systemic evaluation, which is scarce even in 
developed economies, this is among the first studies to investigate the effectiveness of R&D 
and innovation policy in transition economies. We estimate treatment effects for small and 
medium-sized firms (SMEs) in six Western Balkan countries. Empirical findings from 
matching estimators indicate no input and output additionality, while we find evidence of 
behavioural additionality. These results highlight the importance of conducting a systemic 
evaluation of innovation public support. We discuss theoretical and policy implications 
stemming from our empirical findings.  
 




Ever since Schumpeter’s seminal work, the importance of R&D and innovation for sustained 
economic growth and long-term competitiveness has been widely acknowledged among 
economic scholars as well as among entrepreneurs and policy makers. As a result, 
governments around the world have been allocating a wide range of public instruments to 
promoting R&D. Government intervention is justified on the grounds of non-appropriability, 
non-divisibility and uncertainty that prevent firms from totally internalizing the benefits of 
R&D investment (Arrow, 1962) resulting in the level of private R&D investment below the 
socially optimal level (Spence, 1984). 
However, policy interventions directed at innovation need to go beyond the solution 
to market failure to achieve successful innovation (Antonioli et al., 2014). Innovation is a 
complex process involving different actors and interactions and therefore has a “system” 
nature (Edquist, 2005). From a system perspective, standard innovation policies such as R&D 
subsidies can be used to address system failures and enhance firms’ innovation capabilities, 
competencies and interactions with external actors leading to behavioural additionality 
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(Antonioli and Marzucchi, 2012). In line with an increasing demand for systemic evaluation, 
one recommendation is that the concept of additionality should be explored in an integrated 
approach (Magro and Wilson, 2013). To reflect this emerging practice, our first contribution 
in the area of innovation research is to assess all three types of additionality - input, output 
and behavioural in the Western Balkans (WB), thus adding to a small body of literature on 
government aid for innovation in transition countries. To date, there have been a number of 
firm level studies that found predominantly positive effects of government R&D subsidies on 
firms’ innovation performance (Dimos and Pugh, 2016). However, most of the studies in the 
literature are national level papers with few undertaking a cross country analysis (Crowley 
and McCann, 2018; Radicic et al., 2016; Szczygielski et al., 2017) on a set of countries that 
are far from technological leaders. 
  The innovation process in the Western Balkans is likely to be somewhat different to 
those in more developed economies because they are operating in different institutional, 
innovative and competitive environment (Schwab et al., 2017).  Consequently, the important 
question is whether public support for innovation can help firms in the WBs move up the 
technology ladder given weak state capacity and corruption in the region. This may affect the 
effectiveness of public subsidies and programmes and result in “pick the winners” strategy to 
fund the firms which would engage in innovation regardless of subsidies (Radicic et al., 
2016). Moreover, government bureaucrats have limited technological and business expertise 
in evaluating venture quality (Lerner, 2009). In addition, in countries with weak institutional 
framework and underdeveloped innovation ecosystems, such as WB countries, public 
financing may be insufficient to effectively correct market failures. While in developed 
countries the availability of venture capital may close the funding gap, venture capital funds 
in WB countries are still in their infancy.  
With that in mind, our second contribution is to evaluate whether public support 
measures are effective in the case of SMEs. As argued by Herrera and Sanchez-Gonzales 
(2013), contemporary knowledge of the relationship between firm size and innovation policy 
is insufficient for policymakers to make informed decisions about policy design, stimulation 
of certain technologies or accumulation of knowledge. Although large firms have been 
regarded as main actors in the process of technological change and future growth, smaller 
firms are now viewed as agents of change bringing technological diversity which stimulates 
growth and evolution of industry (De Jong and Vermeulen, 2006).  
In the Western Balkans, SMEs represent above 99% of total number of enterprises 
and employ more than 67% employees (OECD, 2018). Likewise, SMEs account for more 
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than half of the total added value created, therefore, their capacity to innovate is essential for 
a country’s success in a competitive global business environment. Our focus on SMEs fits 
within the objective to provide ‘less and better’ state aid (Moncada et al., 2010) and is in line` 
with the flagship initiative ‘Innovation Union,’ established in the context of the ‘Europe 
2020’ targets (EC-DG Research and Innovation, 2011). The aim of the policy is to encourage 
innovation activities of firms facing specific constraints. Moreover, the Small Business Act 
for Europe highlights the need to encourage collaboration to improve the transfer of 
knowledge between SMEs. 
The remainder of this paper is structured in five sections. Section 2 draws on 
innovation literature to discuss the effects of R&D subsidies on input, output and behavioural 
additionality in SMEs, followed by the review of empirical studies. Section 3 provides a 
comparative perspective of R&D and innovation policies in the Western Balkans. Section 4 
provides an overview of the matching estimators and data used in the study and specifies the 
empirical model. Section 5 discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, section 6 
concludes and provides policy recommendations. 
 
2. R&D subsidies and additionality effects 
 
Government support for R&D investment is based on two well-known arguments. The first is 
the public good problem associated with R&D investment in that it is both non-rivalrous and 
not (completely) excludable leading to a lower than the optimal social level of investment in 
research (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). Consequently, the appropriability of R&D outputs is 
not perfect, which reduces the incentives to do R&D on the part of the private firms. The 
second is related to capital market imperfections that hamper firms’ ability to raise external 
finance due to the information asymmetry between investors and borrowers. In essence, R&D 
investments are associated with high risks and uncertainty, long time horizons and often 
involve multiple stages of development, thus investors cannot anticipate the value of such 
investments with confidence (Hall and Lerner, 2010).  
In contrast to mainstream theories motivating public support for innovation, the 
evolutionary perspective posits that firms are embedded in a national network of institutions 
(Chaminade et al., 2018). From this perspective, innovation outcome is the result of learning 
processes and the quality and quantity of interactions between different institutions at all 
administrative levels (Gobble, 2014; Lundvall and Nielsen, 2007). Therefore, including 
4 
 
evolutionary insights and systems perspectives on innovation enables more complete 
assessment of the impact of public measures on firms’ innovative behaviour (Georghiou and 
Clarysse, 2006).  
Direct subsidies that are the focus of this paper are among the most widely used and 
extensively studied policy instruments used to mitigate market failures. Their aim is to reduce 
the share of costs of R&D investments borne by private firms and consequently the amount 
of financing that needs to be raised. However, the positive effects of R&D subsidies on 
innovation and technological progress may not realise as firms might undertake projects at 
the same scale even if no subsidies were granted. In that case, firms will simply substitute 
their own R&D spending with public subsidies, leading to full or partial crowding out effects 
of private investment, under-mining the argument for “additional” effects of public aid. Since 
large firms have larger R&D capacity they are more likely to apply for R&D subsidies.   
Potential reasons for crowding out are not only related to firm behaviour, but also 
with government agency selection procedures. Although policy makers have designed the 
eligibility criteria for public R&D programs, the evaluation of technological and business 
potential may prove to be a difficult task. Further, funding agencies may favour innovation 
projects with high private returns or low risk or projects that were highly likely to succeed 
anyway (Wallsten, 2000). In case that government wants to maximise the returns of the 
subsidy program, they may well choose to finance only large firms. Their successful 
implementation might improve the image of the funding agency, but is not socially optimal, 
as it may crowd out other potentially successful investment that could have taken place. In 
the following subsections, we are going to shed more light on the potential relationship 
between R&D subsidies and SMEs innovative behaviour. 
2.1 Input additionality in SMEs 
 
It is well recognized that SMEs underinvest in R&D due to capital market 
imperfections as size appears to be correlated with the availability and stability of internally-
generated funds (Schumpeter, 1942). Going beyond capital market imperfections, several 
other explanations have been put forward to explain lower propensity of SMEs to engage in 
innovative activities. Firstly, small firms are not able to spread the risks over a large number 
of R&D projects and produce an output over which they can apply the results of their R&D 
expenditures, both in terms of cost reduction (process innovation) and development of new 
products (Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Ortega-Argiles et al., 2009). Secondly, high variance in 
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expected returns and very low probability of achieving a high pay-off reduces the incentives 
of SME to invest in R&D and makes it more unlikely that it will choose to finance through 
capital markets (Scherer and Harhoff, 2000). Thirdly, heterogeneity between SMEs also plays 
a role as firms differ in their competences (Garcia-Quevedo and Mas-Verdu, 2008) and 
entrepreneurial spirit (van Praag and Versloot, 2008). Given the limited resources, it is 
expected that SMEs will invest fewer resources in R&D and when they do, they will mostly 
focus on technological development activities that provide immediate solutions to the 
problem (Santoro and Chakrabarti, 2002) and generate knowledge that is close to the firm’s 
technological domain and its market (Roper et al., 2004).  
A traditional approach for assessing input additionality is based on estimating firms’ 
own R&D investment in the presence of subsidies. However, the longstanding question is 
whether firms complement or substitute subsidy for their own R&D effort (Dimos and Pugh, 
2016). Namely, receiving public support for innovation activities could induce firms to 
increase their innovation efforts, which is regarded as additionality (i.e. a complementary 
effect). In contrast, firms might substitute their private innovation investment with public 
funding, which is a crowding-out effect (Radicic et al., 2016). As previously discussed, the 
theory alone cannot be used to predict the size or the direction of the effect of R&D subsidy 
on private R&D. On the one hand, provision of public subsidies aims to mitigate market 
failures, but on the other hand their effectiveness may be reduced by self-interested selection 
procedures on the part of public bureaucracies and asymmetric information between public 
agencies and private firms. Therefore, the issue of additionality versus crowding out effects 
remains an empirical one (Dimos and Pugh, 2016). 
Most of the empirical literature has been conducted in the context of developed 
countries and reported positive and significant, albeit small input additionality in the case of 
SMEs (e.g. Alecke et al., 2012; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011; Radicic et al., 2016). In 
recent meta-analysis, Dimos and Pugh (2016) tend to reject full crowding-out effects but 
reveal no evidence of substantial additionality. Differentiating between R&D expenditure on 
basic research, applied research and technological development activities, Herrera and 
Sanchez-Gonzales (2013) found that SMEs focus mostly on the latter two when requesting 
public R&D subsidies. Moreover, Czarnitzki and Delanote (2015) find the largest treatment 
effects both in terms of R&D expenditures and in terms of R&D employment for high-tech 
small young firms relative to low-tech young firms and non-independent counterparts. 
Apart from increased R&D expenditure and R&D employment, it is expected that 
participation in public grants can induce positive changes in firms’ R&D-related behaviour.  
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For example, through innovation firms can expand the base of codified and tacit knowledge 
and increase their technological performance (Hewitt-Dundas, 2006) and absorptive capacity 
(Radas et al., 2015). Public R&D subsidies make it possible for firms to engage in new 
projects and accumulate new knowledge through experience and collaboration. Therefore, 
even in the absence of input additionality, the impact of subsidies may be positive to the 
extent that the potential substitutability of input and output additionalities with behavioural 
additionality is accounted for (Clarysse et al., 2009; Georghiou, 2002).  
2.2. Output additionality in SMEs 
 
Few studies attempt to analyse output additionality which is somewhat puzzling given 
that innovation output represent the ultimate aim of public R&D subsidies. Most studies find 
positive effects of R&D subsidies on output additionality when innovation output is measured 
in terms of patenting activities (Bronzini and Piselli, 2016; Czarnitzki and Hussingar, 2018). 
Focusing specifically on SMEs, Foreman-Peck (2013) find that public support increases the 
probability of introducing product or process innovations in manufacturing and service UK 
SMEs. Radicic et al. (2016) investigate SMEs in traditional manufacturing industries, and 
report that public support typically increases the probability of technological and non-
technological innovations and of their commercial success by around 15%. Hottenrott and 
Lopes-Bento (2014) assess the effectiveness of direct financial support for R&D in fostering 
innovation via its capacity in firstly promoting companies’ input additionality in Flemish 
SMEs.  
In comparison to other studies we focus on innovation outcome. Specifically, we use 
the dichotomy ‘sale of products new for the firm’ and ‘sale of products new for the market’. 
This distinction has important implications for firms’ innovation strategy and evaluation 
strategy of policy maker (Beck et al., 2015). In accordance with Kaufmann and Tödtling 
(2001), ‘sale of products new for the firm’ is associated with incremental innovations aimed 
at increasing the competitive position in the same market and ensuring their long-term 
survival and thus requires few resources and relatively simple collaboration relationships 
(Keizer and Halman, 2007). ‘Sale of products new for the market’ is associated with radical 
innovations focused on the value of the firm and the impact of the technology on the market. 
This type of innovation has the ability to shift the technology frontier of firms/sectors and 
enable firms to diversify their markets. Firms with strong emphasis on innovation and 
technology are more likely to engage in radical innovations associated with higher costs and a 
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longer and unpredictable life cycle (Herrmann et al., 2006). Since investment in radical R&D 
often entails high risk and uncertainty and firms are usually risk-averse, underinvestment in 
radical R&D may be more pronounced. Therefore, it is expected that public support will be 
aimed at the type of investment where market imperfections are higher. However, in short 
and medium term, innovation output from less radical innovation projects may be favoured 
by both firms and policy makers (Beck et al., 2015).  
Analysis of firm size and the degree of novelty of innovation output are scarce and 
inconclusive (Oke et al., 2007; Paulson et al., 2007). On one hand, it is argued that large 
firms have the advantage when it comes to incremental innovation due to their superior 
capacity and knowledge (Oke et al., 2007). On the other hand, Paulson et al. (2007) argue 
that SMEs have flexibility and speed when introducing innovations. In the case of radical 
innovation, it has been argued that financial returns are greater for large firms give their 
market reach (Paulson et al., 2007). Alternatively, SMEs are sometimes founded on a radical 
idea that may be able to renew an entire industrial sector (Koellinger 2008). In addition, 
Kassicieh et al. (2002) associate small firms in certain sectors with the commercialization of 
disruptive technologies that generate discontinuous innovations.  
In general, the literature has not dealt with analysing how innovation policy affects 
economic returns to innovation with respect to the degree of novelty of innovation output of 
SMEs in the context of developing countries. It still remains unclear whether public R&D 
subsidies are productive and whether their impact is higher when market failures are more 
pronounced.  
2.3 Behavioural additionality in SMEs 
 
Behavioural additionality refers to knowledge acquisition and developments of learning and 
R&D management capabilities, competencies and strategies, including cooperation strategies  
(Antonioli and Marzucchi, 2012). Although the concept of behavioural additionality has been 
used with different interpretations and dimensions (Gök and Edler, 2010; OECD, 2006), we 
choose as relevant that of cooperative relations with other partners. This is in line with the 
evolutionary framework, which argues that overcoming the limited cognitive capacity of 
agents is the main rationale of an innovation policy (Bach and Matt, 2005).  
R&D cooperation has emerged as an appropriate measure both for its theoretical 
underpinnings stemming from the resource-based theory of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) and 
its empirical relevance (Busom and Fernandez-Ribas 2008; Cerulli et al., 2016; Clarysee et 
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al., 2009). According to the resource-based view, firms seek access to complementary or 
similar resources (Arranz and de Arroyabe, 2008). Recently there has been a systematic and 
fundamental change in the way how firms undertake innovative activities. Scholars studying 
social capital have emphasised the role of networks and linkages with other social entities as 
a mean to access various resources that would be beyond firms’ reach if they were to act in 
isolation (Elfring and Hulsink, 2003). The importance of external ideas, knowledge and 
networks has also been emphasised in the open innovation model (Chesbrough, 2003) where 
SMEs are expected to engage in technology collaboration networks to search for and access 
external resources required for innovation. From the perspective of the wider innovation 
ecosystem, the greater the technological diversity between firms, the greater the opportunities 
to cooperate to innovate more complex products that are harder to imitate and thus a source 
of individual competitive advantage (Song, 2016).  
Research collaborations are an important channel for both unintended knowledge 
spillovers and deliberated forms of knowledge access (D’Este et al., 2013). The literature 
identifies many advantages of cooperation that help SMEs to overcome the liability of 
smallness and increase their ability to innovate. First, cooperation enables SMEs to increase 
their competitiveness by pooling, integrating and combining their resources with external 
partners (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003) and enables them to share costs and risks related to the 
development of new technology (Ferreira et al., 2015; Hagedoorn, 2002). Inter-firm R&D 
alliances are seen as opportunity to gain access to complementary technological resources 
which can speed up the innovation process, improve market access and contribute to 
economies of scale (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; López, 2008). Second, cooperation in 
innovation activities allow firms to internalize R&D spillovers, providing benefits not only to 
the innovating firm but also to other partners involved (Becker and Dietz, 2004) and these 
spillover overs tend to larger for small firms (Chun and Mun, 2012). 
With that in mind, geographical proximity is frequently claimed to be beneficial for a 
successful collaboration and exchange of tacit knowledge. However, the importance of 
geographical proximity has been questioned, the main argument being that “simple” co-
location is neither a prerequisite nor a sufficient condition” (Boschma 2005, p.71). It is 
argued that institutional, cognitive, and social proximity also matter. For example, 
cooperation between academia and industry is characterized by lower institutional and 
cognitive proximity which can bring about novel solutions and variety in both firms’ internal 
routines and lead to more radical forms of innovation (Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2001).  
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However, problems typically arise due to increased exploitation costs in terms of 
processing, understanding and absorbing external knowledge (Noooteboom, 2000) and due to 
differences in research goals and incentive structures (Ponds et al., 2007). The more partners 
involved in the network, the more complex the transfer of information. Opportunistic 
behaviour by partners may have negative effects on cooperation as they may lack incentives 
to reveal their internal inventions. This creates the climate of mistrust and leads to a reduced 
effort in cooperative partnerships when cooperating firms do not clearly specify which 
partner will be assigned exclusive property rights (Dhont-Peltrault and Pfister, 2011). Further, 
searching for an appropriate partner and building up trust, as well as the costs related to 
contracting and enforcement between the involved partners are associated with transaction 
costs (Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2014). These costs are particularly important for SMEs as 
they often lack the critical factors for successful cooperation, such as partnership governance, 
managerial skills and experience necessary for developing and maintaining successful 
cooperative ties (Radicic et al., 2018). To overcome the complexities of these collaborations 
and to enforce a mutual trust, geographical proximity may still play a role in establishing 
successful partnerships between organizations with different institutional backgrounds.  
The previous arguments have important implications on firms’ cooperative decisions. 
As long as partners’ proximity in one of the dimensions compensate for distance in another, it 
is expected that propensity to cooperate would increase. Cooperation costs are expected to 
increase with distance and therefore a simple administration of an R&D subsidy can induce 
firms to engage in cooperation and attenuate the costs implied by different gaps in the 
proximity between firms and other institutions (Marzucchi et al., 2015). 
 The literature also identifies several channels that condition firms’ preferences 
regarding the type of cooperative partner. R&D cooperation with external partners such as 
customers, suppliers and private or public knowledge providers is related to a variety of 
advantages. The main reason for vertical cooperation associated with suppliers and customers 
is that firms gain access to complementary resources and capabilities (Un et al., 2010).  For 
example, cooperation with suppliers can facilitate knowledge sharing on cost reduction 
technologies and help firms to improve their current products or introduce new products 
(Belderbos et al. 2004). Cooperation with customers can facilitate market acceptance and 
commercialization of new products. In addition, customers have been found to be 
instrumental when new products require adaptations for their usage due to their complexity or 
novelty (Tether, 2002). 
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Cooperation with competitors is of great value for a firm since rivals often have 
similar needs in the innovation process (Lhuillery and Pfister, 2009). The main motive for 
collaborating with competitors is risk and cost sharing in innovation projects by pooling 
similar resources (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). However, firms within the same industry have 
the incentive to protect their knowledge as this is the main source of their competitive 
advantage. Therefore, competitors will systematically restrict the knowledge flow and engage 
in opportunistic behaviour that could lead to a failure of joint R&D project (Lhuillery and 
Pfister, 2009). This may be especially pronounced for SMEs operating in low and medium 
tech industries as they seldom use formal means to protect their intellectual property rights 
(Radicic and Pugh, 2017).  
            Cooperation with universities and research institutes may spur the creation of radical 
innovations as they provide cutting edge knowledge to a firm (Belderbos et al., 2004). In 
addition, engaging in university collaboration may be an attractive option for firms with 
limited investment in R&D as it allows inexpensive and low-risk access to a large and diverse 
knowledge base (Foreman-Pack, 2013; Radicic et al., 2019). Compared to vertical and 
horizontal types of cooperation, it entails the greatest ease of access, low risk of knowledge 
leakage and of opportunistic behaviour. 
            Given the prominent role of trust, firms are more likely to cooperate with government 
institutions which are willing to share knowledge while posing no commercial threat (Radicic 
et al., 2019). Since the likelihood of mistrust and appropriability issues is less likely to occur 
when cooperating with government institutions, SMEs in low and medium-tech sectors that 
usually do not engage in formal protection of intellectual property are more likely to engage 
in public-private partnerships. 
Finally, cooperating with consultants, firms have access to deeper levels of expertise. 
Tether and Tajar (2008) found that similar factors determine relationships between firms and 
either specialist knowledge providers and public research organizations. They argue that 
firms with limited investment in R&D are more prone to cooperation with consultants as their 
intellectual property is mostly tacit in nature. 
Although scarce, most empirical studies on behavioural additionality report positive 
policy effects. Of these, most report larger additionality effects for public-private partnerships 
than for cooperation with other businesses (Busom and Fernández-Ribas 2008; Radicic et al., 






3. R&D and innovation policy in the Western Balkans: Comparative perspective  
 
Despite some differences, the Western Balkan countries share common historic, institutional 
and market similarities.1 The region has experienced economic and political transition 
including the transition from war to peace in the 1990s. Economic transformation was mainly 
based on macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalisation, enterprise privatization of 
traditional industries and attraction of FDI. However, recent financial crisis revealed 
weaknesses of an economic growth model based on expansion of domestic consumption, 
stagnant productivity and very limited integration into EU Global Value Chains (Radosevic, 
2013). The emphasis on economic and political reforms had several consequences for 
research and the innovation sector. Strong reliance on capital inflows, deindustrialisation and 
excessive tertiarization accompanied by political instability and weak institutional 
frameworks led to declining importance of the research sector, low R&D investment, brain 
drain, limited ICT utilisation, obsolete scientific equipment, weak abilities for university-
industry collaboration and commercialisation of research results (Svarc, 2013). In addition, 
underdeveloped private sectors and dysfunctional market institutions coupled with relatively 
weak administrative capacities and a lack of cooperation and coordination among 
government agencies are obstacles to sustainable and coherent innovation policies (Matusiak 
and Kleibrink, 2018). 
The WBs’ innovation systems are characterised by highly centralised governance 
systems concentrated in the public sector, typical of less developed countries and 
technological followers that suffer from the lack of market forces and insufficient cooperation 
with innovation stakeholders inhibiting technological development (Svarc, 2013).  
One of the major factors limiting the further development of research, development 
and innovation (RDI) is very low expenditure on research and development (Figure 1). 
GERD remains below 0.5% of GDP in most countries, except Serbia and Croatia where it 




                                                          
1
 Although Slovenia does not formally belong to the Western Balkans, the country is included in the analysis 





Figure 1. Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % of GDP, 2015 
 
Source: Eurostat Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) and Unesco Science Report (2016) 
Note: 2014 for Bosnia and Herzegovina; 2008 for Albania 
 
This is still well below the EU average and far below the investments needed to create 
resources for technological accumulation and knowledge based-economy (Svarc, 2013).  
Business R&D expenditure as percentage of GDP is only a fraction of that in the EU (Figure 
2). As an illustration, in B&H and FYRM it accounted for only 0.05% and 0.08%, 
respectively, while in the EU it reached 1.31%. Despite underinvestment in R&D, recent data 
from European Innovation Scoreboard suggest that self-reported innovation in firms is higher 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in comparison to new member states. The levels of 
product and process innovation in Serbia and FYRM is comparable to the EU average of 13% 
(OECD, 2018). Given their low levels of R&D investment, we can infer that most of these 
innovations are non-technological in nature which can also be supported by high levels of 


















Figure 2. Business expenditure on R&D, % of GDP, 2015 
Source: Eurostat Business Expenditure on R&D (BERD) 
Note: 2014 for Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 
The decreasing propensity to invest in R&D can also be inferred from significant brain drain. 
The migration of large number of scientists, engineers and technicians during the first decade 
of transition significantly reduced the region’s research capacity. On the positive side, 
enrolment to higher education has increased in the last decade which has also translated into a 
higher number of researchers in absolute and per capita terms, although still below levels in 
other EU countries (Unesco, 2016). However, most of them are employed in academia, 
reflecting low demand for business R&D reported in Figure 2.  
One of the most underdeveloped elements of institutional support is related to 
financial tools available for development and commercialization of inventions. Access to 
finance is still one of the major constraints in the region (EBRD, 2016) which has important 
implications for innovation-oriented entrepreneurship. Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013) 
find that firms operating in countries with more severe financial constraints are less likely to 
engage in innovation, with the greatest detrimental effect found in countries with high costs 
of external finance and among small and young firms. The WBs is not an exception as low 















borrowing and lack of investment readiness (OECD, 2018). The supply of venture capital is 
absent or in very early stages, mostly available in Slovenia and Croatia.2  
The WBs’ technological effort at the world frontier, as measured by the US patents, is 
limited. The region applied for 38 patents in the United States in 2012, compared to an 
average of 25 patents for the leading US research universities and institutions (World Bank, 
2013). Similarly, patents, granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) per million inhabitants in the period 2002-2013 show a significant variation 
between countries. Croatia (45.9) and FYROM (25.6) are clearly the frontrunners in 
comparison to other countries where this number is extremely low. A low productivity of the 
regional innovation system is an additional evidence of a weak technological transfer. As an 
illustration, a unit of Croatian or Serbian US registered patents has required between four and 
eight times more R&D expenditures, respectively, than a German patent (World Bank, 2013). 
In sum, the discussion above points to an “innovation paradox” where the need for 
innovation and catch up in less developed economies is high but institutional context and 
factor endowments may be lacking (Oughton et al., 2002). Moreover, institutional features 
inherited from centrally planned system along with economic and institutional restructuring 
during the transition period have resulted in a variety of country-specific patterns of 
innovation activities as evident from the aforementioned discussion. 
4. Survey, data and methodology   
4.1 Survey and data  
 
The dataset used in this study was gathered in 2014 within the Pacinno project funded by the 
IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) Cross-Border Cooperation Programme.3 The 
                                                          
2
 Recently, a set of complementary measures for improving access to finance for SMEs has been launched 
coordinated by the European Investment Fund, the European Commission and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. The Enterprise Development and Innovation Facility aims to improve access 
to finance by SMEs in the region. It consists of three components: Enterprise Innovation Fund (ENIF) aimed at 
early development stage equity financing in innovative SMEs; Enterprise Expansion Fund (ENEF) providing 
development and expansion capital to established high-growth potential SMEs; and Regional Guarantee Facility 
aimed at improving SMEs’ access to bank lending and lowering the cost of borrowing, by providing SME loan 
portfolio guarantees to financial intermediaries. 
3 For more information about the project, see https://hilab.di.ionio.gr/pacinno/. The Pacinno project is a 
collaboration platform that connects into a single regional innovation system researchers and academic 
institutions, policy makers, and innovative companies of eight countries belonging to the Adriatic region 
(Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia). The goal of the 
project was to establish a platform for cooperation in research and innovation covering the whole Adriatic 
region. The project targeted research institutions, policy makers and firms, through three key areas of action: 
research of innovation on micro, meso and macro level, training of human resources and knowledge and 
technology transfer. More generally, the project was aimed at overcoming the main obstacles and barriers to the 
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survey was conducted between May 2014 and December 2014 and most questions refer to the 
period 2011-2013. The questionnaire was developed partially using the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) methodology, a widely used source of information about innovation 
activities of firms across EU. However, CIS only partially covers Serbia and does not cover 
B&H, Montenegro and Albania, thus our data represent one of the few sources on innovation 
activities in these countries.  
Project members anticipated the practical difficulty with obtaining a large number of 
responses from SMEs. One corollary of the anticipated low response rate was that simple 
representative sample of SMEs would include an insufficient number of firms engaged in 
innovative activities.  Therefore, a stratified random sampling method was used in all 
countries4 based on the overall population of micro, small and medium firms, but biased 
towards more innovative sectors. The innovative sector was determined from official 
secondary data, when available; otherwise researchers from the specific country made the 
decision. To this end, a two-fold approach was implemented by partners on the project. First, 
to align the sample frame as closely as possible to the target population, a list of SMEs was 
taken from official sources such as Chambers of Commerce or National statistical offices and 
they were approached via email addressed to the company legal representative. Secondly, to 
ensure an adequate number of firms in each country and to address initial low response rates 
in Serbia and Albania, the companies were contacted by telephone to organize a meeting. 
After that, a team visited companies in person and filled the survey on the site.  
After partially completed surveys have been omitted (with cut-off criteria of at least 
10% of missing values), the sample amounted to 646 SMEs. Response rate range from 27% 
in Montenegro to only 5.4% in Slovenia (Table 1), which is similar to other surveys 
(Souchon et al., 2015). Due to a significant number of missing values, the effective sample in 
our analysis vary from 141 to 204 observations.  
 
Table 1. Response rates by country  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
economic development of the Adriatic countries, fostering SME competitiveness (both in the high-tech fields 
and in the traditional industries), and promoting the creation of innovative start-ups, increasing the innovation 





 Croatia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia.  
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 Slovenia Croatia Albania B&H Montenegro Serbia 
Response rate (%) 5.4 18 24 19 27 15 
Completed surveys  92 149 107 109 118 71 
 
While detailed breakdowns are relegated to the Appendix (Table A.1), we summarize 
the main findings of comparative analysis between subsidized and non-subsidized firms. As 
far as subsidized firms are concerned, the majority is concentrated in the knowledge intensive 
services and high-tech manufacturing sectors (53.5%). Subsidized firms are also more likely 
to engage in export (72%) and cooperate with external partners (62%) versus non-subsidized 
firms (60% and 43%, respectively). Despite the fact that non-subsidized firms have a higher 
propensity to invest in R&D then subsidized firms, analysis of innovation outcomes between 
the two groups of firms show that subsidized firms are more likely to engage in product, 
radical and incremental innovation, although for the latter there is no statistically significant 
difference between the two groups. When it comes to cooperation, there is a statistically 
significant difference between subsidized and non-subsidized firms across all modes of 
cooperation except with suppliers. Looking at the cooperation figures, subsidized firms 
develop more cooperative ties. 
4.2. Variables  
 
The treatment variable (Support) is a binary indicator equal to 1 if a firm received any public 
financial support for innovation activities either from local/regional, national or EU level in 
the period 2011-2013, and zero otherwise (Radicic et al, 2016). In investigating input 
additionality, we use the outcome variable R&D, which is a binary indicator equal to 1 if a 
firm invested in internal or external R&D and zero otherwise. As for the output additionality, 
we use four binary variables that capture whether firms introduced product, process, 
incremental and radical innovations and the share of turnover of new or significantly 
improved products as a measure of the market success of product innovation (i.e. innovative 
sales). Finally, for behavioural additionality, the seven outcome variables measuring firms’ 
cooperation activities are used to identify firms involved in different forms of R&D 
cooperation. They are defined as binary indicators equal to 1 if the firm cooperates with the 
following potential partners (and zero otherwise): suppliers; customers; competitors; 
consultants; HEIs; and government institutions. We also created the variable Coop_breadth 
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by measuring the number of cooperative partners or cooperation breadth, which captures the 
networking effect of R&D arrangements (Beker and Dietz, 2004). Besides network 
additionality, to capture changes in firms’ behaviour that augment their absorptive capacity, 
we created the variable Training, which is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm has in-house 
or contracted out training for personnel specifically for the introduction of new or 
significantly improved products and processes, and zero otherwise. Public support could have 
an impact on the creation of absorptive capacity which may induce high levels of new 
technology adoption and the introduction of technological innovation.5 
  Control variables account for the heterogeneity of firms with respect to their size, 
exporting activities and financial performance. Previous empirical literature found close 
correlation between firm size and innovation output (Beneito, 2006; Veugelers and Cassiman, 
1999). We controlled for firm size by using the natural log of employment. Exporters might 
have more incentive to innovate as a result of competitive pressure on international markets 
and thus be more likely to self-select into public support programmes (Busom and 
Fernández-Ribas, 2008). In addition, exporters potentially have a larger network of 
cooperation partners than do non-exporting firms.  
We also control for different governance structure. Our assumption is that network 
connections arising from belonging to a group enables firm to have better access to 
information about government actions and, consequently, increase chances of receiving 
subsidies (Aerts and Schmidt, 2008). Furthermore, the model includes four variables 
capturing different sources of external knowledge: internal, market, institutional and other 
sources. Finally, the model includes a dummy variable for non-EU countries: Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia (see Table A1 for variable description and 
descriptive statistics). Similar to other studies (e.g. Ballot et al., 2015), we control for 




A critical element of any evaluation exercise is a proper modelling of participation in support 
programmes. Namely, treatment assignment into support measures should be regarded as 
endogenous due to selection bias arising in the process of application and distribution of 
public measures. The selection bias occurs because a) firms self-select themselves into 
                                                          
5
 We thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
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programmes, and b) the government adopts a 'picking-the-winner' strategy during the 
selection process (selecting those firms that are more likely to succeed with their project) 
(Cerulli, 2010). 
Concerning behavioural additionality, endogeneity of public support would imply that 
the probability of establishing and maintaining cooperative relationships is correlated with 
the receipt of innovation support, in which case estimated programme effects would be biased 
and inconsistent. Namely, some support programmes do explicitly address cooperation as an 
output and so might be subject to biased selection by programme managers; and, those firms 
most inclined to cooperate may be the ones with the greatest propensity to self-select into 
support programmes (Czarnitzki and Delanote, 2015; Foreman-Pack, 2013).  
In order to reduce sample selection bias we adopt propensity score matching (PSM)  
technique. Since it is not possible to observe the same firm in two different scenarios (with 
and without R&D support) we create a counterfactual using a firm with very similar 
characteristics in all respects other than receiving R&D support. The central feature of 
matching analysis is the relationship between a treatment variable (R&D support) and the 
outcome variables defined in the previous section. 
We estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), which indicates the 
difference in outcomes of the treated firms with and without treatment and can be written as: 
      [  |   ]   [  |   ] (1) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (1),  [  |   ], is the expected outcome for 
subsidised firms conditional on their participation, while the second term  [  |   ] is the 
expected outcome had treated firms not participated in the public support programme. This 
second term refers to a counterfactual outcome that is not observed but estimated. To 
estimate the ATT effect, it is necessary to assume that all relevant differences are captured in 
the observed attributes of the treated and untreated firms. That is, no bias from selection on 
unobservables is present, otherwise matching yields biased estimates (Caliendo and Kopeinig 
2008). To define propensity score we used a logit model to identify and summarize the key 
characteristics of treated firms. Once we have obtained propensity scores, we match treated 
with comparable untreated firms. 
Having a large number of relevant variables is of high importance particularly when 
matching estimators are applied, given that the assumption of selection on observables 
critically hinges on the inclusion of all variables affecting the innovation process. However, 
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because the selection on observables is achieved by matching the treatment and the 
comparison group, obtaining the appropriate size of the common support (i.e. matched pairs) 
requires a large dataset (Cerulli, 2010). Following Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), 
asymptotically all matching estimators should yield similar results. However, finite properties 
of various matching algorithms are not fully explored. Hence, in small samples like ours, the 
choice of the matching algorithm can be important (Heckman et al., 1997), which usually 
includes a trade-off between variance and bias. For this reason, the literature on matching 
estimators suggests that researchers should use several matching estimators, as there is no 
consensus on which estimator is superior to others (Guo and Fraser, 2010).  
As a robustness check, we apply the following two estimators. Nearest Neighbour 
(NN) matching is the most commonly used estimator in the innovation literature (Herrera and 
Nieto 2008). In applying the Nearest Neighbours (NN) estimator, subsidized (treated) firms 
are matched with non-subsidized firms (as a control group) with the closest estimated 
propensity scores. We also used Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW). The 
crucial step in the matching procedure is the choice of covariates X. The literature suggests 
that all observed variables that simultaneously affect a treatment and an outcome should be 
included in the estimation of propensity scores (the selection equation) (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). Following Steiner et al. (2010), in situations when researchers have little or 
no information on the selection mechanism (which is usually the case in innovation studies), 
the optimal modelling strategy is to include a large set of covariates, because this approach 
increases the probability of satisfying the assumption of selection on observables.    
The final step in the matching process is to assess its effectiveness. Matching as an 
evaluation method is based on two identifying assumptions. The first is the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA), unconfoundedness or selection on observables (Imbens 
2004). This condition states that both counterfactual outcomes, Y0 and Y1, are independent of 
a treatment assignment T, conditional on observed covariates X. The CIA is a strong 
assumption and requires that all relevant observed variables are included in the estimation of 
treatment effects and that variables are measured before treatment assignment (or that they 
measure fixed effects or slow-moving firm characteristics). The second refers to the overlap 
or common support condition, which states that both treated and non-treated firms have a 
positive probability of receiving a treatment or not (thus avoiding perfect predictability of a 
treatment assignment conditional on X).  
As noted above, matching estimators cannot control for unobserved characteristics, 
which creates two additional issues in evaluating public measures: treating the selection 
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process as a 'black box'; and producing potentially biased treatment effects. Given that 
researchers do not possess information on the quality of the proposed R&D projects (Grilli 
and Murtinu, 2011), assuming that unobserved factors have no impact on the treatment 
effects will give rise to biases in the estimated treatment effects. In this context, we 
conducted an additional robustness check by estimating a copula-based endogenous 
switching model (see Section 5.1 below), which accounts for both observed and unobserved 
firm heterogeneity. 
 
5. Results of the empirical analysis   
 
The correlation matrix showing the Pearson correlation coefficients among the independent 
variables is presented in Table A2 in Appendix. The correlations are overall low to moderate 
suggesting that multicollinearity is minimal. To further assess potential problems with 
multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) and the conditioning index were 
calculated. The former is 1.34, which is substantially lower than the conservative cut-off of 
10 (Fernández-Olmos and Ramírez-Alesón, 2017), while the latter is 18.24, which is below 
the cut-off value of 20 (Greene, 2012, p. 90). These results suggest that the regression 
estimates are not biased by the presence of multicollinearity.  
The propensity scores estimated by logit models are shown in Table A3. The literature 
on matching suggests the inclusion of even those covariates that are statistically insignificant, 
because their inclusion does not increase bias in subsequent matching estimations (Millimet 
and Tchernis, 2009). Moreover, our study is limited by a lack of information on the selection 
process, which means that a large number of covariates should be modelled in the estimation 
of the propensity score. Furthermore, models that evaluate output and behavioural 
additionality include R&D expenditures as an additional matching variable. Czarnitzki and 
Lopes-Bento (2013) note that the inclusion of the innovation input indicator, such as R&D 
expenditures, enables the matching algorithm to find suitable matches between treated and 
untreated firms, but with the same level of investment in R&D expenditures. 
Treatment effects of any matching estimator based on the propensity score are only 
estimated in the region of common support. Thus, it is necessary to check the overlap of the 
propensity scores such that both treated and untreated firms have a positive probability of 
receiving a treatment or not. The overlap plots, reported in Figure A1, reveal that the 
predicted probabilities are not concentrated near 0 or 1, which implies that the overlap 
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assumption is not violated (Cattaneo et al., 2013). Having verified the balancing property, we 
can proceed with the computation of ATT effects. 
Table 2 presents the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) effects estimated by 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM), Nearest Neighbour (NN) and Inverse Probability of 
Treatment Weighting (IPTW). The treatment effects are fairly consistent across the three 
matching estimators. Concerning input additionality, the results uniformly indicate no 
additional effects of public support on R&D activities. With respect to output additionality, 
empirical findings are mostly consistent and suggest no additional effects of public support 
on innovation outputs. There is weak evidence that public support might increase the share of 
sales from new products (i.e. innovative sales) (the estimated ATT from NN matching is 
positive and marginally significant; p<0.10), but this result is not robust with respect to 
different matching estimators.   
Table 2. Estimated Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) using three 
estimators: Propensity Score Matching (PSM), Nearest Neighbour (NN) and Inverse 
Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW).  
Outcome 
variables 
































































































Cooperation 0.323** 0.326** 0.313*** 145 
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Notes: ***, **, * ATT estimated at the one, five or ten per cent level of significance; 
a
 Abadie and Imbens 
(2009) derived a method for variance estimation for NN matching which is applied in this study.  
 
Finally, the only additional effect presented in the Table 2 is associated with 
behavioural additionality. Namely, the results suggest that public support positively affects 
cooperation with consultants and with government institutions. Furthermore, there is weak 
evidence that public support might induce firms to expand their cooperation with competitors 
and universities (and other HEIs), but these results are not robust across different matching 
estimators. Regarding vertical cooperation with customers and suppliers, our results 
uniformly indicate no additional effects. In contrast, for cooperation breadth the estimated 
treatment effects are consistent, positive and highly statistically significant. Namely, 
receiving public support induces firms to expand their cooperative networks by, on average, 
one partner (p<0.01).6 In relation to the impact of public support on training activities, our 
results suggest no significant effect.  
5.1. Further robustness check  
 
Given that the main disadvantage of matching estimators is that they only take into account 
endogeneity due to the selection on observables (as noted in Section 4.3), our further 
robustness check is conducted by estimating a sample-selection model. This model controls 
for both selection on observed and unobserved heterogeneity. However, empirical results 
from this model should be considered with caution, because our dataset does not contain a 
valid instrument, i.e. the exogenous variable that would be correlated with the endogenous 
variable (i.e. treatment variable) but would have no effect on the outcome variable. In other 
                                                          
6
 As pointed in footnote 1, Slovenia does not formally belong to the Western Balkans. As a further robustness 
check, we estimated the models from Table 2 without Slovenian firms. The results are shown in Table A4 in 
Appendix. Qualitatively, they are the same as the main results, except for input additionality measured with 
R&D, for which our estimates tentatively suggest additional effects, as the treatment effect is not robust across 




words, as the model relies only on the functional form, the identification problem can 
introduce bias in the standard errors (Cerulli, 2010). 
In particular, we estimate a copula-based endogenous switching regression model 
(also known as a Roy model or a type 5 tobit model, Hasebe, 2013). The main advantage of 
the copula approach is that the assumption of a joint normality of the error terms in the 
outcome and selection equations is relaxed (Smith, 2003). Another advantage is that the 
copula method allows the model to be estimated via the maximum likelihood method, which 
means that the estimates are efficient (Hasebe, 2013). A copula represents a joint distribution 
function that binds together marginal distributions of the error terms in the selection and the 
outcome equations, although the copula itself is independent of marginal distributions (Smith, 
2003). In our analysis, we have considered a range of copulas: Gaussian; Frank; Plackett; 
Clayton; AMH; FGM; Joe; and Gumbel (for detailed discussion see Hasebe, 2013; Smith, 
2003). In each of the estimated models reported below, the preferred copula was determined 
using the Vuong test together with the AIC and BIC information criteria. The former 
evaluates the contribution of each copula to the log likelihood, such that the copula with the 
highest contribution is preferred. In addition, the smallest AIC or BIC suggests the preferred 
copula (Hasebe, 2013; Smith, 2003). 
The results from the copula models are presented in Table 3 below. Column 3 reports 
the Likelihood Ratio test of the null that the errors from the equations of the estimated 
switching model are independent (these diagnostics support the validity of the switching 
model). For the estimates for input and output additionality, p-values for the LR tests are all 
below the conventional five per cent threshold, which suggest that we can reject the null of 
the independent error terms in the equations of the corresponding switching models. 
Therefore, there is no diagnostic failure at the conventional five percent level in these models. 
For the estimates for behavioural additionality, there are three models for which the 
independence assumption does not hold at the conventional five percent level: cooperation 
with consultants; cooperation with HEIs; and training. Although the independence 
assumption cannot be rejected at the five per cent level, it can be rejected at the ten per cent 
level. Therefore, there is a marginal evidence of the dependence in error terms. As the theory 
suggests that receiving public support for innovation is endogenous, and thus an endogenous 
switching model should be estimated, we are inclined to accept a marginal evidence of the 
dependence in error terms. Moreover, when the independence assumption cannot be rejected, 
two independent equations can be estimated as their estimates will be consistent (Miranda 
and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006).   
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Although most results are consistent with findings from matching estimators, we 
comment on those that are different from matching. First, the treatment effect related to input 
additionality, in particular R&D activities, is positive and highly statistically significant (at 
the 1% level). We interpret these results as a potential additional effect that public support 
might have on innovation inputs, although, again, these results are tentative. Second, 
concerning output additionality, the results from the copula models suggest that public 
support increases the probability of incremental innovation and the share of sales from 
innovative products. Third, with respect to behavioural additionality, the results from the 
copula models are consistent with the results from matching, in cases where additional effects 
are reported. However, unlike the results from matching, the results from the copula models 
indicate the crowing-out effects of public support on cooperation with suppliers, customers, 
competitors and HEIs. These findings are in line with Greene's (2009) conjecture that 
evaluation methods controlling for unobservable influences find smaller programme effects 
than do methods controlling only for observable influences (Radicic et al., 2016).  
Table 3. Average treatment effects on the treated (ATTs) using the copula approach 
(bootstrapped standard errors, 1,000 replications) 
Outcome variable Copula 




R&D expenditures Joe  p = 0.0047 
0.837*** 
(0.023) 
Product innovation  Plackett p = 0.0287 
-0.363*** 
(0.001) 
Process innovation  Plackett p = 0.0000 
-0.399*** 
(0.001) 
Radical innovation Plackett p = 0.0004 
-0.439*** 
(0.004) 
Incremental innovation Plackett p = 0.0082 
0.547*** 
(0.005) 




















AMH p = 0.0946 
0.314*** 
(0.009) 
Cooperation with HEIs Clayton p = 0.0670 
-0.265*** 
(0.000) 
Cooperation with Frank  p = 0.0434 0.140*** 
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government  (0.003) 
Cooperation breadth  Plackett p = 0.0000 
0.256*** 
(0.000) 
Training  Plackett p = 0.0852 
-0.382*** 
(0.003) 
Notes: *** ATT estimated at the one per cent level of significance.  
 
6. Discussions and conclusion 
 
A key objective of this article was to evaluate whether R&D subsidies induce additional 
treatment effects with respect to innovation inputs, outputs and R&D cooperation in SMEs in 
the WB countries. Despite a large number of evaluation studies on the impact of R&D 
subsidies in the developed countries, there is a dearth of evidence in transition economics, 
and in particular in the WBs. Besides the lack of quantitative evaluation studies in the WBs, 
another less investigated issue is the effectiveness of R&D subsidies in promoting innovation 
in SMEs. Here, evidence is scarce, even in the case of firms in developed countries. 
Our empirical evidence from three matching estimators uniformly show no additional 
treatment effects with respect to SMEs’ innovation inputs and outputs. These results are 
somewhat expected if one knows that firms in the WBs are most likely to be innovation 
adapters and competitiveness tends to be driven by investment in higher education and 
training, the creation of efficient markets and the ability to absorb foreign technology, typical 
of efficiency driven economies. Therefore, the development of absorptive capacity at this 
stage is more important for catching-up than investment in R&D and it is likely that firms 
rely more on soft drivers for their innovation activities. 
Another possibility is that while public support does not induce SMEs to increase 
innovation inputs and outputs, they instead allow firms to continue their R&D and innovation 
activities at a constant level rather than cutting back. In other words, while public support 
may not have funded additional R&D projects and innovation activities, they may have 
allowed firms to avoid eliminating ongoing innovation activities. 
According to Autio et al. (2008), a dearth of empirical studies on behavioural 
additionality prevents the design of effective, evidence-based public policy. Our study 
contributes to addressing this lacuna by exploring the effectiveness of innovation support 
programmes on firms’ cooperative behaviour. Concerning behavioural additionality, we find 
that public support does not promote cooperation with customers and suppliers, marginally 
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promotes cooperation with competitors and universities, and strongly promotes cooperation 
with private-sector consultants and government institutions. These findings are in line with 
most previous empirical studies on behavioural additionality (Busom and Fernández-Ribas 
2008; Radicic et al., 2018).  
Furthermore, empirical findings from matching estimators indicate that full crowding 
out occurs in the case of innovation inputs and outputs. However, full crowding out may not 
constitute a complete waste of public funds, because the level of R&D inputs and outputs are 
maintained and – by implication - resources thereby released that may support innovation 
over a period longer than can be captured by cross-sectional research. Such an interpretation 
receives support from the strong positive behavioural effects. These results echo the findings 
by Radicic et al. (2018), who report large behavioural effects of public support on 
cooperation in traditional manufacturing SMEs.  
Positive policy effects on cooperation reported in the study could reflect the fact that 
the region is a target of many EU policies aimed at developing international cooperation and 
region’s inclusion into EU Innovation programmes (Matusiak and Kleibrink, 2018). In 
particular, strong emphasis is put on measures supporting international collaboration in R&D 
and innovation. The latter accounts for almost 10% of gross domestic expenditure on R&D 
(GERD) (OECD, 2018). Also, in recent years, the governments in the region are becoming 
more aware of challenges stemming from brain drain and low levels of international 
collaboration and research mobility. To tackle the issue, knowledge networks, provision of 
installation grants and funds for joint research between the local scientific community and 
scientific diaspora have been put in place (Svarc, 2013).  
6.1 Implications for theory  
 
The results of this study make two important contributions to existing literature. First, 
our findings suggest that evaluation studies of innovation support programmes should be 
designed to capture not only input and/or output additionality but also behavioural and 
systemic effects. While Georghiou (2002) argues that input and/or output additionality and 
behavioural additionality are substitutable, Clarysse et al. (2009) suggest that they are 
complementary. Our results provide preliminary support for Georghiou’s (2002) argument. 
However, following Radicic et al. (2018), to investigate the dynamics of these two 
hypothesised processes will require the study of rich longitudinal data.  
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Second, this study adds new evidence on the effectiveness of public R&D programs in 
transition economies. Scholars have little knowledge regarding whether R&D support 
programmes might induce additional policy effects on SMEs’ innovation activities in 
transition countries characterized by weak R&D investments such as those of the WBs. Our 
results suggest the importance of improving appropriability mechanisms, expanding firms’ 
limited absorptive capacity and the role of government in strengthening innovation 
ecosystems in the region which is further discussed in the next section. 
6.2 Implications for policy  
 
Following Un and Montoro-Sanchez (2010), public funding increases the likelihood 
of innovation outputs but only when combined with firms’ own resources. This could be 
particularly pertinent to SMEs in the Western Balkans, whereby these firms are faced with 
multiple issues with respect to innovation activities: insufficient internal human and financial 
resources; lack of or insufficient external finance (public as well as private, e.g. VCs and 
angel investors); and lack of other policy instruments, such as R&D tax credits. Therefore, 
SME-specific innovation policy in the Western Balkans should be designed to complement 
an overall innovation environment, in particular by strengthening the appropriation regime 
(Schneider and Veugelers, 2010) and providing private finance sources for risky investments 
in innovation. To tackle the problem of insufficient finances for innovation, a prominent new 
financing instrument has been recently introduced. The Enterprise Innovation Fund of the 
Western Balkans Enterprise Development and Innovation Facility finances innovative and 
technology-driven SMEs from the seed to expansion phase (OECD, 2018). Moreover, 
although not investigated in this study, public procurement for innovation, as a demand-side 
policy measure, has a potential to exert greater additional effects than supply-side measures. 
This could be particularly promising for the WB countries, as Tracogna (2016: 8) concludes 
concerning innovation policy in the Adriatic Region: “… governments’ capabilities to 
effectively conceive and steer innovation ecosystems are limited.” 
Our finding show that public support induces firms in the Balkans to expand their 
cooperative network. This is in line with Tracogna (2016), who argue that concerning 
Adriatic Region, cooperation schemes between national and regional governments, business 
sectors and universities, technological institutes, technological parks/business incubators and 
research institutes need to be supported, while systemic cooperation between research and 
private/public companies should be reinforced. 
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Furthermore, public support that results in improved cooperation for innovation may 
enhance the functioning of innovation ecosystems and thus indirectly promote firms’ 
innovative performance via the process of cumulative causation (i.e. policy effects go beyond 
short-run innovation input and output effects) (Radicic et al., 2018). Our results show the 
largest effect of R&D subsidies on cooperation with government agencies and consultants 
and a potential for positive policy effects on cooperation with HEIs and competitors. 
Cooperation with universities and research institutes enables firms to tap into new knowledge 
from fundamental research (Ebersberger and Herstad, 2011; Un et al., 2010). Also, 
cooperation with public institutions and HEIs is characterized with mutual trust and lack of 
opportunistic behaviour, which, following discussion in Section 2.3., may yield favourable 
policy effects. Our empirical findings of a relatively weak positive effect of public support on 
cooperation with HEIs would seem to be a suitable topic for investigation by all parties 
concerned. There is another, unintended, but important by-product of strengthening firms’ 
cooperative ties with HEIs. Namely, it would improve a research base of HEIs and their 
absorptive capacity, which would further strengthen innovation ecosystem in the WB 
countries. 
Finally, public support can encourage cooperation between firms, HEIs and 
government, in which case strengthening the regions’ HEIs and governmental institutions 
could feed back into enhanced absorptive and innovation capacity in firms. In turn, this poses 
multiple challenges to ensure that the whole incentive structure is aligned to facilitate 
cooperation and that innovation outcomes are monitored to prevent rent seeking by firms, 
HEIs and/or government personnel.7 
6.3 Limitations and directions for future research  
 
This study has limitations that remain to be addressed. The first is reverse causality. 
Within the limitations of our cross-section dataset, we are unable to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, in particular with respect to previous innovation activities and cooperative 
behaviour. For instance, continually cooperating firms could be more likely to apply for 
funding, in which case public funding may be wrongly identified as a cause of cooperation 
behaviour. The second limitation concerns the extent of external validity. In the absence of 
sufficient observations to estimate policy effects separately by industry and country, we 
cannot conclude definitively that we have fully accounted for industry and country biases. 
                                                          
7
 We thank an anonymous referee for this point.  
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While our results may reasonably be used to inform policy on public support for SMEs in the 
Western Balkans, policy makers should always be alert to the possibility of country and 
industry variations. The third limitation is that available data does not allow assessment of the 
effectiveness of public support on other types of behavioural additionality, such as cognitive 
capacity additionality. Fourth, since longitudinal data is not available, the way to gain direct 
evidence bearing on behavioural change may be by interviewing. Finally, cross-sectional data 
precludes exploration of the medium- to long-run programme effects. 
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics on innovative firms. 
Variable 
 
Description Subsidized firms 
 
Unsubsidized firms 





of missing          Mean 
Std.
dev   p-value 
Number (%) 
of missing 




   




   
 
R&D (internal or 
external) (binary) 
 
If the firm has an expenditure for in-house 
and/or external RD 0.5641 0.4991 
 
 





If a firm has in-house or contracted out 
training for personnel specifically for the 
introduction of new or significantly 








b) Output additionality         
Product innovation 
(binary) 
If the firm introduces new or significantly 
improved goods or services (0,1) 0.8023 0.4006 
 







If the firm introduces either new or 
significantly improved: a) methods of 
manufacturing or producing goods or 
services or b) logistics, delivery or 
distribution methods or c) supporting 



















If a firm introduced new or significantly 
improved products new to the market (0,1)  0.8356 0.3732 
 







If a firm introduced new or significantly 
improved products that were only new to the 
firm (0,1) 0.8056 0.3985 
 
 







Innovative sales  
The percentage share of sales from new or 
significantly improved products that were: a) 
new to the market and b) new to the firm 









   136 
(40.48) 






















If the firm cooperates with the customers 
(0,1) 0.9091 0.2897 
 
 






If the firm cooperates with the competitors 
(0,1) 0.6721 0.4733 
 





If the firm cooperates with the consultants 
(0,1) 0.4545 0.5025 
   
  32 (36.78) 0.2917 0.4556 0.021 
 120 
(35.71) 
Cooperation with HEIs 
 
If the firm cooperates with the HEIs (0,1) 0.6032 0.4932 
 
  24 (27.59) 0.2719 0.4460 
        





If the firm cooperates with the government 
(0,1) 0.5246 0.5035 
 
26 (29.89) 0.1982 0.3995 
        0  119 
(35.42) 
Cooperation breadth The number of cooperative partners 3.7636 1.6326 32 (36.78) 2.8208 1.6366 0.011  124(36.9) 
Control variables          
Turnover in 2010 (log) 
The market sales of goods and services 
(Include all taxes except VAT) (logarithm) 0.1249 4.1433 
 




If the firm sell goods and/or services to 
countries other than the home country  0.7209 0.4512 
 
    1 (1.15) 0.5982 0.4910 0.031 
  
10 (2.98) 
Firm size (ln) 
Enterprise’s average number of employees 
(logarithm) 3.3669 1.1233 
 





Whether firm belong to an enterprise group 0.2267 0.4215 
 
   12(13.79) 0.1650 0.3718 0.305 
  
0(0) 
Non_EU (binary) Whether country is not EU member 0.4483 0.5002 0(0) 0.6369 0.4816 0.001  0(0) 
Sources of external knowledge (categorical)         
Internal  
The level of importance of knowledge 
sources within the firm or the enterprise 
group 2.000 0.760 
 
 





The importance of suppliers, customers, 
competitors and consultants  0.456 0.214 
 




The importance of universities and 
government and public institutions  0.394 0.336 
 




The importance of a) conferences, trade fairs 
and exhibitions; b) scientific journals and 
trade/ technical publications and c) 











Sectors (percentage)          
High-tech manufacturing 
If the firm belongs to high-tech sector 
according to 
NACE2 classification (0,1) 9.30 0.2922 
 
 





If the firm belongs to low-tech sector 
according to NACE2 classification (0,1) 22.09 0.4173 
 






If the firm belongs to knowledge-intensive 
service sector according to NACE2 
classification (0,1) 44.29 0.4995 
 
 






If the firm belongs to less knowledge-
intensive service sector according to NACE2 
classification (0,1) 10.47 0.3079 
 
 





(electricity, water supply 
and construction) 
If the firm belongs to other sectors according 








Note: t-test on mean differences is used for continuous variables while Chi2 test and Mann-Whitney tests are used for binary and ordinal variables, respectively. 
* Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), the scores on each of these knowledge sources (ranging from 0 if a firm does not use a particular knowledge source to 3 for a high degree of 
importance) are summed up and the total score is rescaled to a number between 0 and 1.
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Table A2. The correlation matrix. 
Independent 
variables 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Turnover 
in 2010 
1.000         
2. Export -0.003 1.000        
3. Firm size 0.167** 0.087 1.000       
4. Group  0.018 0.114 0.301*** 1.000      
5. Non-EU -0.136** 0.066 0.024 0.003 1.000     
6. Internal 
sources 
-0.103 0.079 -0.021 0.168** 0.305*** 1.000    
7. Market 
sources 




0.105 0.053 -0.002 0.170** -0.128* 0.100 0.520*** 1.000  
9. Other 
sources 
0.089 0.038 0.039 0.083 0.143** 0.257*** 0.459*** 0.376*** 1.000 
Notes: ***, **, * correlation coefficients at the one, five or ten per cent level of significance. 
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Table A3. Results of logit estimations. Dependent variable: participation in public 
support programmes in the period 2011-2013.  
Variables 
































































































Industry DVs Included Included Included 
Pseudo R
2
 0.113 0.114 0.141 
LR χ
2
 25.15** 25.41** 24.82** 
No of obs. 204 204 157 
































































































































































Notes: ***, **, * ATT estimated at the one, five or ten per cent level of significance; 
a
 Abadie and Imbens 
(2009) derived a method for variance estimation for NN matching which is applied in this study; 
b
 The outcome 
variable Training has all missing values for Slovenian firms, thus the results in this table are the same as in 
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Propensity score
support=0 support=1
Model 3 - Behavioural additionality
